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Key Events 
Four key events are addressed in this briefing note. Key event one is the 
announcement in April and May of 2017 with the launch of two 
supercomputers in Canada (Graham at University of Waterloo; Cedar at 
Simon Fraser University) and a third (Niagara at The University of 
Toronto) using Compute Canada’s Resources Allocation (Compute 
Canada, 2018a).  Key event two is the announcement that Huawei 
Canada is building Graham’s operating system (Feldman, 2017). Key 
event three entails CSIS being warned by the US Senators (Rep. Sen 
Marco Rubio and Dem. Sen Mark Warner) about the possibility of China 
and Russia spying on Canada. Key event four, the United States has 
reportedly banned sales of Huawei products on US military bases 
(Bronskill, 2018; Collins, 2018).  
This briefing note is particularly relevant as Compute Canada is now 
preparing for 2019 resource allocation; there may be a raised/elevated 
security risk of economic espionage intellectual property theft and 
abusing education access privileges which needs to be considered (SFU 
Innovates Staff, 2018). 
Nature of Discussion 
This briefing note will explore the potential risk of foreign nationals 
accessing Canadian innovation and research linked to healthcare data, 
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artificial intelligence, and data modeling. In particular, focusing on 
supercomputing systems known as Cedar and Graham.   This briefing 
note will use a kill chain model to demonstrate a prior case example of 
how Ruopeng Liu allegedly stole data about the manufacturing of 
metamaterials from Dr. David Smith’s Duke University lab (McFadden 
et al, 2018), which specializes in research regarding “invisibility 
cloaking technology.” That technology may have then been used by Liu 
to create a start-up company called Kuang Chi Science in Shenzhen 
China that is now worth approximately six billion and linked to Chinese 
military product development using similar low radar visibility 
metamaterials (McFadden et al). 
A similar attack will be exemplified in which vector can be used in 
Canada to target Canadian supercomputing projects and associated 
research hosted on the supercomputer network.   
This briefing note will also introduce open source articles and 
commentary in which the need for a cybersecurity assessment to be 
conducted with specific focus on how supercomputing contracts 
currently at Compute Canada and CFI innovation are funded. These 
contracts include contributions by Lenovo and Huawei, which arguably 
may lead to potential security risks.  
Indications of the potential security risks that may be poised by Lenovo 
and Huawei are noted in the following examples: Lenovo was ordered 
to pay a fine of $7.3m for allegedly installing adware in 750,000 laptops 
(Waqas, 2018), the installation of microchips on Elemental computers 
(developed in China by Supermicro) deployed inside U.S. Department 
of Defence data centres (Robertson & Riley, 2018), and China’s 
government ability to directly influence Chinese company operations 
(U.S. House of Representatives, 2012). 
This briefing note will then address the possible connection between 
Huawei and supercomputing risks in Canada. Lastly, an outline will be 
provided of a potential attack that may involve compromising an 
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individual with access to any of the computers connected to the Arbutus 
network. By spoofing the credentials of one of these targets, attackers 
may gain access to the computers computational power.  This access 
may be gained through users who are active teaching faculty and may 
become a target of opportunity for a potential attacker. 
Background 
Two potential attack vectors against supercomputing are possible: the 
human vector, and the technological vector. The human vector is 
potentially a foreign national student and the technological vector is a 
spoofing attack.  
Human Vector: A potential attack under the kill-chain model could be 
demonstrated as follows. A university student conducts reconnaissance 
(by potentially becoming a trusted member of a research project thus 
gaining access to the computer network), gathering information on 
potential targets and technical specifications (server details, operating 
systems used, vulnerability to malware, etc). Once having gathered the 
data, the student would then gain access to the network, through the use 
of legitimate credentials for the purpose of stealing data, also known as 
weaponization of access privilege. Once system access has been 
obtained, the student would then steal the research data set. The data is 
then moved to a foreign nation, which is then potentially converted into 
military products for a foreign government.   
Technological Vector: “A spoofing attack is when a malicious party 
impersonates another device or user on a network in order to launch 
attacks against network hosts, steal data, spread malware, or bypass 
access controls” (DuPaul, n.d.). A spoofing attack to compromise Cedar 
and Graham could be feasible if potential attackers are able to identify 
researchers with access to that network. In 2018, a list containing more 
than 400 names associated with research projects that utilized Cedar and 
Graham computing resources was made available online (Compute 
Canada, 2018b). This list could potentially provide a number of targets 
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for identity theft and spoofing, which are then converted into login 
credentials via keylogging software or other backdoor access. 
Listed names included researchers from across Canada in a variety of 
fields and topic interests. Some of whom are active teaching faculty at 
their respective institutions. Attackers may pose as students, in order to 
send infected files possibly disguised as assignment submissions or other 
seemingly legitimate documents containing keyloggers or spyware. In 
this way, the user can be compromised, and attackers can access to the 
system.  Once Cedar and Graham is compromised, it could then be 
vulnerable to a malware upload; potentially resulting in disruptions to 
the system or a potential backdoor access to the system being 
implemented.  
Implications of these attacks. Analysis of the Compute Canada 2018 
project data requests reveals research allocation projects which included 
artificial intelligence and big data analytics (2018b). These projects may 
be relevant to Canadian Armed Forces and Canadian police services who 
are currently using or exploring the role of AI and big data modeling in 
order to combat dark web activities. Furthermore, such research 
frameworks are also being pursued at various Canadian universities. 
This target rich environment is similar to the security risk at Duke 
University, which was previously noted in the nature of discussion.  
Previous Supercomputer hacks.  Similar supercomputer hacks have 
occurred and demonstrate there are vulnerabilities which can be 
exploited.  
In 1999, a boy of fifteen years known as C0mrade caused a 21-day 
shutdown after hacking NASA computers and invading Pentagon 
systems. In June 1999, he accessed 13 computers at the Marshall Flight 
Space Centre and downloaded $1.7 million worth of NASA proprietary 
software that supports the space station’s environment. Between August 
and October 1999, he entered the computer network ran by the Defence 
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) through a router in Dulles, VA., and 
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intercepted DTRA emails which included 19 usernames and passwords 
of employees, ten of which on military computers (Wilson, 2000).  
In 2013, Andrew James Miller was able to gain access to the 
supercomputers used at the National Energy Research Scientific 
Computing Center in the Lawrence Berkeley National Lab California. 
He was arrested by the FBI when he attempted to sell root access to the 
supercomputers to an undercover FBI agent via an online chat platform. 
Selling unauthorized access to a government supercomputer would have 
enabled the purchaser to easily compromise information resources for 
the US Department of Energy (Goodin, 2013).  
In 2014, a New Zealand based weather supercomputer named Fitzroy 
was hacked from an IP that was reportedly traced back to China. Paul 
Buchanan, a former policy analyst for the US Secretary of Defense, 
noted that the attack followed similar Chinese patterns and may have 
been searching for back doors to other government computers including 
computers with access to Five Eyes network. Fitzroy’s operators were 
confident that the hackers did not get beyond the supercomputer 
(Richmond, 2014). 
Based on current case studies, the impact of these hacks are summarized 
as threats against intellectual property, compromised infrastructure 
security, and a loss of confidence in academic institutions’ ability to 
adequately protect national security based research.   
While searching for historical cases of supercomputers being hacked, 
there is evidence that supercomputers may also provide a solution.  In 
2018, a potential countermeasure against hacking powered by current or 
future supercomputers was announced. A team from Monash University 
is claiming to have “devised the world's leading post-quantum secure 
privacy preserving algorithm – so powerful it can thwart attacks from 
supercomputers of the future” (Monash University, Faculty of 
Information Technology, 2018). This algorithm allows for the secure 
transfer of data, as well as the preservation of user privacy. Furthermore, 
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it was noted that even taking into consideration the future existence of a 
more powerful quantum computer, which allegedly would be able to 
easily break the current security algorisms in use, the Monash University 
developed algorithm “HCash” will remain secure and continue to protect 
user privacy. (Monash University, Faculty of Information Technology). 
Huawei. In the past some Chinese companies have reportedly been 
connected to incidents involving compromised computer security.  In 
particular, the microchip found in Supermicro was connected to 
supercomputing mother boards (Robertson & Riley, 2018). Currently, 
there are security concerns about Huawei as a cybersecurity threat that 
have been expressed by US and the Five Eyes intelligence community.  
As reported in the Globe and Mail (2018), Canada, “does not allow 
Huawei to bid on federal government contracts.” The contracts for 
Graham and Cedar supercomputers are funded by the Canadian 
Innovation Fund, which is a federally funded agency to implement and 
manage research which benefits Canadians. This funding is linked to 
Computing Canada, Cedar and Graham supercomputing, and Huawei 
Canada. Given that Canada does not allow this bidding, there are still 
concerns that “the Shenzhen-based firm (Huawei Canada) has 
established relationships with leading research universities in Canada to 
create a steady pipeline of intellectual property to underpin its market 
position in 5G technology” (Fife & Chase, 2018 para. 15). 
CSE - Security Review - University Responsibilities to Address 
Huawei Canada Impact on Risk. 
The detaining and possible extradition of Ms. Wanzhou Meng (Chief 
Financial Officer of China’s Huawei Technologies) by Canadian 
officials in December 2018, may raise concerns or speculations about 
the extent of Huawei Canada’s influence on Canadian national security, 
in particular, 5G telecommunications design and implementation.  As 
noted above, these concerns can be dated back to 2012 in the U.S., and 
2013 in Canada with CSE providing:  
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Advice and guidance to mitigate supply-chain risks in 
telecommunications infrastructure upon which Canadians rely, 
including, since 2013, a program that has been in place to test and 
evaluate designated equipment and services considered for use on 
Canadian 3G and 4G/LTE networks, including Huawei. [The] testing is 
called the Security Review Program. Risks could affect equipment 
ranging from private cellular phones to large communications 
networks, corporations and governments (Fife & Chase, 2018 para. 5). 
This kind of testing can be used to inform risk management issues and 
tasks which are identified as a condition of funding by the CFI funding 
guidelines.  These guidelines can be traced back to 2013 and have 
evolved to address a variety of risk management issues, for example:   
Innovation Canada at Section 5.1.1 (p. 24), recognizes the need to ensure 
the institution deals with 5.1.3; special requirements for certain types of 
infrastructure projects; the institution should ensure that researchers 
follow existing guidelines and adhere to the requirements for their 
research facility. In signing the Institutional agreement, the institution 
agrees to conform to these guidelines (Canadian Foundation for 
Innovation, n.d.). 
1. Compute Canada and the CFI Grant recognize the need for 
managing funding and also to ensure that Compute Canada can, 
“review options for hosting, operating, and maintaining the 
infrastructure to provide the highest quality and most cost-
effective total solution” (Compute Canada, 2018c). It was further 
noted that “Compute Canada can leverage its existing CFI-
funded data centres, technical, and staffing investments to 
provide extremely high quality and cost-effective operations and 
maintenance of systems as part of the national platform, meeting 
a variety of uptime and security requirements” (Compute 
Canada, 2018c). 
2. Innovation Canada provides best practices insight into a risk-
based management approach to ensure the funding project is well 
managed.  Included in that document, is specific mention that 
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some projects will require more oversight than others.  This is 
addressed in the proposal development and internal review 
stages:  
The internal vetting process ensures that project risks that may hinder 
success have been identified (e.g. potential for significant delays and 
cost escalations or insufficient capital and operating funds) and that 
mitigating measures, including any oversight activities, have also been 
discussed (Canadian Foundation for Innovation, 2017 para. 3). 
Innovation Canada also recognizes the need for additional oversight of 
large or complex projects which includes oversights such as “scope and 
issues” and requires those receiving funding to have clear definition of 
the roles and responsibilities to ensure “improved risk management 
during project implementation and mitigation of adverse impacts [if 
any]” (Canadian Foundation for Innovation, 2016&2017). 
Based on the information found in open sources, the following points are 
noted. 
1. The national security threat from Chinese telecommunication 
companies can be traced back from 2012 and 2013.  
2. Canadian government agencies were actively looking at this 
threat.  
3. Universities who are involved in supercomputing projects have 
risk management mandates and responsibilities. 
4. There is a track record of three Chinese telecommunication 
companies who are currently involved in litigations which are 
directly related to national security concerns in Canada.  
Key Points of Discussion and West Coast Perspectives 
Increased security reviews and oversights are necessary to protect 
Canadian researchers and their intellectual property. SFU has an 
established history of working with federal and provincial contracts.  Is 
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there an opportunity to provide additional security? And if so, what kind 
of security and at what costs?  
Increased siloed security around military and public safety 
research.  As noted previously, access via researcher credentials can 
potentially lead to a compromise of national security. The research 
allocation projects that share a relationship with law enforcement models 
may be susceptible to such a compromise. For example, SFU is 
conducting various research projects concerning artificial intelligence 
and as mentioned above, artificial intelligence is a rich field for attack 
(Canadian Foundation for Innovation, 2017). In addition, with some 
projects potentially sharing a close relationship with the military, the risk 
is further increased. As projects with either a direct military relationship 
or potential military application may be preferentially selected as targets. 
Is it now critical requirement to have a Chief Security Officer for all 
supercomputing projects answering to an external governance body?   
Double Edged Challenge. British Columbia has a large international 
student population and is actively engaged around the world on a variety 
of academic initiatives.  While this is promoting global partnerships, it 
is essential there be sufficient safeguards in place to protect Canadian 
interests.  How do we promote international cooperation while also 
protecting Canada’s intellectual property?   
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